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1  Introduction 
Following  the work  of  Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Evans  (2005)  and 
Smets  and Wouters  (2003),  many  central  banks  are  building  and  esti 
mating  dynamic  stochastic  general  equilibrium  (DSGE) models  and  are 
using  them  for monetary  policy  analysis.  These  models  are  also  widely 
used  in  the  academic  literature  to answer  a variety  of  policy  questions. 
A  key  assumption  underlying  the policy  analysis  with  DSGE  models  is 
that  the parameters  characterizing  preferences  and  technologies  as well 
as  the  law  of motion  of  aggregate  shocks  are  invariant  to  the  policy 
changes  studied  with  the DSGE  model.  The  paper  by  Jesus  Fernandez 
Villaverde  and  Juan  Rubio-Ramirez  (FVRR),  provides  novel  empirical 
evidence  that  changes  in  the  conduct  of monetary  policy  might  coincide 
with  changes  in  the  structural  parameters  that  determine  the  degree  of 
nominal  rigidity  in  the  economy. 
Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez  use  state-of-the-art  econo 
metric  techniques  developed  in  some  of  their  earlier  work  to estimate  a 
medium-scale  DSGE  model  in  which  many  of  the key  parameters  are  al 
lowed  to vary  over  time.  The  main  finding  of  the  empirical  analysis  is 
that  the  parameters  controlling  nominal  rigidities  drift  in a  substantial 
way  and  are  strongly  correlated  with  the  target  inflation  rate. My  com 
ment  will  provide  a  discussion  of  the methodology  employed  in  the 
empirical  analysis.  Moreover,  I  will  contrast  the  authors'  empirical  find 
ings  with  estimates  obtained  from  a  constant-parameter  DSGE  model 
that  is fitted  to  three  different  post-war  periods.  Although  posterior  dis 
tributions  for  some  of  the model  parameters  have  shifted,  there  is not 
much  evidence  that  the  transmission  of monetary  policy  shocks  and  the 
inflation-output  trade-off  have  significantly  changed. 150  Schorfheide 
2  Shocks  and  Time-Varying  Coefficients 
Many  DSGE  models  are  built  around  a  representative  household  that 
solves  the  following  problem 
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Here  C,  denotes  consumption,  Ht  is hours  worked,  v  is  the  Frisch  labor 
supply  elasticity,  Kt  is the  (predetermined)  capital  stock  in period  t,  Wt  is 
the wage,  t,  is  the  labor-income  tax  rate,  Rt  is  the  rental  rate  for  capital, 
and  T*  captures  net  lump-sum  transfers.  Taking  first-order  conditions 
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My  discussion  will  for  now  focus  on  the  preference  parameter  B. Ac 
cording  to  (1), B  is a parameter  that  determines  the marginal  rate  of  sub 
stitution  between  consumption  and  leisure  and  hence  shifts  the  labor 
supply  function.  Much  of  the  analysis  in FVRR  has  the flavor  of  replac 





p)  In B  +  p In Bt_x +  ebt. 
Of  course,  time-varying  parameters  are  not  new  to  the DSGE  model  lit 
erature.  They  are  commonly  called  shocks.  The most  prominent  shock  is 
a  time-varying  productivity  parameter,  which  the  literature  refers  to as 
technology  shock.  Time-varying  Bs  also  have  been  widely  used  and  are 
typically  called  preference  or  labor supply  shocks. 
While  the  literal  interpretation  of  the  labor  supply  shock  is  that  of  a 
stochastic  preference  shift  of  the  representative  agent,  we  might  want  to 
think  of  Bt  as  an  omitted  mechanism.  It could  represent  labor  supply 
fluctuations  generated  by  variations  in home  production  technology 
(e.g.,  Benhabib,  Rogerson,  and Wright  [1991]).  Hall  (1997)  conjectures 
that  this  shock  captures  unmodelled  labor market  search  frictions.  The 
work  by  Chang  and  Kim  (2006)  suggests  that  time  variation  in B  can 
arise  if equation  (1)  is used  to approximate  a 
heterogeneous  agent  econ 
omy,  in  which  agents  face  idiosyncratic  productivity  shocks  and  incom 
plete  asset  markets. 
Time-varying  coefficients  or  shocks  in DSGE  mod 
els  are  typically  treated  as  exogenous  and  hence  invariant  to policy Comment  151 
changes.  However,  if  the  time-variation  proxies  for  an  unmodelled 
mechanism,  policy  invariance  is not  self-evident.  The  point  of  departure 
of  FVRR  from  the  existing  literature  is not  so much  the  introduction  of 
time-varying  coefficients  but  rather  studying  whether  the  time 
variation  in  these  coefficients  is related  to  time-variation  in policies. 
3  Identifying  Co-movements  between 
Coefficients  in  a Simple  Model 
In  order  to  ask  the  question  whether  time  variation  in preference  pa 
rameters  is correlated  with  time  variation  in policy  parameters,  the  first 
step  of  the  analysis  consists  of  the  identification  of  the  time-varying  co 
efficients.  In  the  context  of model  (1),  a natural  question  that  one  could 
ask  is  whether  shifts  in  the  preference  parameter  are  systematically  re 
lated  to  changes  in  the  tax  rate.  Observations  on  the  labor-income  tax 
rate  can  potentially  identify  it. The  labor-supply  equation  (2),  in combi 
nation  with  data  on wages,  hours  worked,  consumption,  and  an  esti 
mate  of  the  labor  supply  elasticity  can  be  used  to  infer  the  preference 
process  Br 
Note  that  auxiliary  assumptions  are  important.  Suppose  one  would 
allow  for  time-variation  not  just  in  the preference  parameter  B but  also 
in  the  Frisch  labor-supply  elasticity  v. Taking  logs  of  equation  (2)  and 
solving  for  In  Ht  yields 




Tt) +  In  Wt 
-  In CJ  +  (1 +  vt)]n  Bt.  (3) 
Hence,  potential  time  variation  in both  B and  v  would  make  it a  lot  more 
difficult  to  identify  the parameters. 
I  will  proceed  conditional  on  the  assumption  that  v  is constant  and  use 
U.S.  data  to determine  t,  and  Br  Using  U.S.  quarterly  time  series  from 
Haver  Analytics  (Haver  mnemonics  are  in  italics),  I define  consumption 
as  consumption  of nondurables  and  services  (C 
- 
CD).  I use  population 
sixteen  years  and  older  (LN16N)  to  convert  the  series  into  per  capita 
terms,  and  the  chained-price  GDP  deflator  (JDGP)  to obtain  a measure 
of  real  consumption.  The  real wage  is computed  by  dividing  compensa 
tion  of  employees  (Y COMP)  by  total  hours  worked  and  the GDP  defla 
tor. My  measure  of  hours  worked  is  computed  by  taking  total  hours 
worked  reported  in  the National  Income  and  Product  Accounts,  which 
is  at  an  annual  frequency,  and  interpolating  it  using  growth  rates 
computed  from  hours  of  all  persons  in  the  nonfarm  business  sector 
(LXNFH).  I divide  hours  worked  by  LN16N  to  convert  them  into  per 152  Schorfheide 
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Figure  2C2.1 
Time  Series  of  Preference  Shock  and  Labor  Tax  Rates 
capita  terms.  Finally,  a series  on marginal  labor  tax  rates was  kindly  pro 
vided  by  Selahattin  Imrohoroglu.  The  construction  of  this  series  is de 
scribed  in  detail  in Chen,  Imrohoroglu,  and  Imrohoroglu  (2007).  The 
sample  period  ranges  from  1949:Q1  to  2003:Q4.  With  observations  on 
Ht,  Wt,  Ct,  and  7t  in hand,  one  only  has  to determine  the  Frisch  labor 
supply  elasticity  to be  able  to  compute  Bt, based  on  (2).  I conducted  the 
subsequent  analysis  for v =  0.5  and  v =  2. This  interval  spans  most  of  the 
values  used  in  the DSGE  model  literature.  Since  the  results  were  quali 
tatively  and  quantitatively  very  similar,  I only  report  the  findings  for 
v  =  2. 
The  second  step  of  the  analysis  consists  of  studying  the  comovement 
between  policy  and  nonpolicy  parameters.  Figures  2C2.1  and  2C2.2  de 
pict  time  series  and  scatter  plots  in  lnB,  and  Tr Casual  inspection  of  the 
plots  suggests  that  there  is a positive  correlation.  I proceed  by  fitting  a 
bivariate  VAR(4)  to  the  preference  shock  and  tax  rate  series.  Using  a 
Choleski  decomposition,  I orthogonalize  the VAR  innovations,  assum Comment  153 
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Figure  2C2.2 
Scatter  Plot  of  Preference  Shocks  and  Labor  Tax  Rates 
ing  that  a preference  shock  innovation  does  not  affect  the  tax  rates  con 
temporaneously.  Figure  2C2.3  shows  the  impulse  response  functions  of 
t,  and  InB,  to  a  labor  tax  innovation.  The  solid  responses  can  be  inter 
preted  as  posterior  mean  responses  under  an  improper  prior  distribu 
tion,  whereas  the  dotted  lines  correspond  to  asymptotic  pointwise  95 
percent  credible  intervals.  According  to  the posterior  mean  estimates  of 
the VAR  coefficients,  the  largest  eigenvalue  is 0.97,  which  explains  the 
persistence  of  the  impulse  responses.  An  increase  of  the  tax  rate by  1 per 
cent  raises  the preference  parameter  Bt by  approximately  1 percent.  The 
empirical  analysis  suggests  that  the preference  parameter  B  in  (1)  is cor 
related  with  the  tax  rate  on  labor  income  and  hence  potentially  not  in 
variant  to policy  changes. 154  Schorfheide 
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Figure  2C2.3 
Impulse  Responses  to  a Tax  Rate  Innovation 
Notes:  Impulse  responses  are  computed  with  EVIEWS.  The  solid  line  can  be  interpreted  as 
posterior  mean  response,  and  the  dashed  lines  can  be  interpreted  as  approximate  point 
wise  95%  credible  intervals. 
4  Identification  of  Time-Varying  Parameters 
in  a Large  DSGE  Model 
Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez  conduct  a similar  analysis  on  a 
larger  scale,  focusing  on  changes  in  monetary  policy.  Unlike  my  illustra 
tion,  the  parameters  that measure  the  time  variation  in  monetary  policy 
are  not  directly  observable.  Moreover,  it  is not  possible  to back  out  the 
time-varying  private  sector  coefficients  based  on  simple  calculation,  as 
the  one  based  on  (2). Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez  have  to 
apply  nonlinear  filtering  techniques  to back  out  the  equivalent  of  Bt and  t, 
in my  illustration.  The  large  literature  on  single-equation  and  system 
based  estimation  of monetary  policy  rules  and  New  Keynesian  Phillips 
curves  suggests  that  their  coefficients  are  difficult  to  identify  and  the  esti 
mates  are  often  sensitive  to seemingly  innocuous  auxiliary  assumptions. 
Given  the  scale  of  the  estimated  DSGE  model,  it is very  difficult  to un 
derstand  what  information  in  the  data  provides  information  about  the 
parameters  that  determine  the  extent  of  nominal  rigidity.  Price  and 
wage  stickiness  in  the  authors'  DSGE  model  is based  on  the Calvo  mech 
anism:  only  those  firms  (households)  that  receive  a  green  light  are  al 
lowed  to  reoptimize  their  price  (wages).  All  other  firms  (households) 
have  to keep  their  prices  (wages)  constant  or  update  it using  the  previ 
ous  period's  inflation  rate. Although  the Calvo  model  is consistent  with 
certain  microlevel  observations  of  price-setting  behavior,  it provides  us Comment  155 
with  a  reduced-form  representation  rather  than  a  microfounded  model 
of  nominal  rigidity.  In particular,  if  trend  inflation  is high  it becomes 
very  costly  for  firms  not  to adjust  their  prices.  Hence,  one  would  expect 
that  periods  of  high  average  inflation  are  periods  in which  either  the 
fraction  of  firms  that  does  not  re-optimize  its price  in a given  period  is 
small,  or  that  a  large  fraction  of  firms  that  are unable  to re-optimize  their 
prices  indexes  them  by  lagged  inflation. 
Using  a  slightly  different  notation  than  FVRR,  one  can  express  the 
solution  to  the  firms'  price-setting  problem  as  the  following  system  of 
equations: 
y(D  = 
(po)-v+^Yt  +  p^x^a-xpj-iA  (4) 
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*t =  [(i 
- 
wk(p?)]-1/x  + w^i<**rl/xrx  (7) 
Here  nt  is  the  gross  inflation  rate, MCt  are  real marginal  costs,  Yt  is ag 
gregate  output,  and  p?  is  the price  (relative  to  the  aggregate  price  level) 
charged  by  a  firm  that  is allowed  to  re-optimize  its price  in  the  current 
period.  A  time-varying  fraction  of  firms  ?,  is unable  to  re-optimize  its 
price  in every  period.  A  fraction  xt of  the  firms  that  do  not  re-optimize 
indexes  their  prices  by  last  period's  inflation  rate,  irf/ whereas  the  re 
maining  fraction  uses  the  constant  rate,  tt^,  to  update  their  prices. 
While  it and  \t  are  typically  constant,  FVRR  assume  that  they  follow  sta 
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At  the  same  time,  the  inflation  rate  tt*,  targeted  by  the  central  bank,  also 
evolves  according  to a  stationary  autoregressive  process: 
In it*  = 
(1 
- 
pw+)ln  ir^ +  p^*  In tt*^  +  cr^*  r 156  Schorfheide 
In  the  absence  of  steady-state  price  dispersion,  that  is,  tt^^ 
= 
tt^,  a  log 
linear  approximation  of  the  price-setting  equations  takes  the  familiar 
form 
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Thus,  the degree  of  stickiness  as well  as  the  fraction  of  firms  that use  dy 
namic  indexation  is  irrelevant  in  the  steady  state,  and  neither  ?, nor  xt 
appear  in  the  first-order  approximation.  As  a  consequence,  the  Calvo 
and  indexation  shocks  generate  foremost  higher-order  dynamics.1 
Hence,  the  computationally  costly  estimation  of  a  nonlinear  DSGE 
model  pursued  in  the  paper  is  important.  However  at  the  same  time, 
it  remains  unclear  how  well  the  nonlinearities  and  hence  the  time 
variation  in  t,t and  xt  are  identified  from  the  data  and  how  sensitive  the 
results  are  to more-or-less  arbitrary  auxiliary  assumptions. 
The  estimated  processes  tt,xt,  and  tt* have  a  lot  of  high-frequency 
variability,  more  than  one  would  normally  attribute  to  changes  in,  say, 
the  target  inflation  rate.  Fernandez-Villaverde  and  Rubio-Ramirez 
remove  the  high-frequency  movements  in  the  parameters  using  a 
Hodrick-Prescott  (HP)  filter,  which  produces  the main  results  of  the 
paper.  Casual  inspection  of  the  plots  suggests  that  the Calvo  probabil 
ity  of  not  adjusting  prices  was  low  when  target  inflation  was  high. 
However,  this  story  is  not  quite  watertight:  the  Calvo  probability 
reached  its  trough  in  1965, many  years  before  the  target  inflation  rate 
reached  its peak.  By  1980  the Calvo  probability  had  already  risen  quite 
substantially.  The  interpretation  of  the  price  indexation  coefficient  is 
even  more  difficult.  As  previously  mentioned,  indexation  becomes 
more  attractive  for  firms  if trend  inflation  is  large.  Instead,  the FVRR  re 
sults  indicate  that  indexation  is relatively  low  in  the  late  1970s,  when  in 
flation  is high. 
Despite  the  very  elaborate  nonlinear  estimation  of  the DSGE  model, 
most  of  the  substantive  conclusions  are  drawn  from  fairly  casual  in 
spections  of  smoothed  time-varying  parameter  estimates,  obtained  un 
der  the  assumption  that  changes  in policy  rule  coefficients  and  Calvo  pa 
rameters  are  independent.  Unlike  in  a  regime-switching  framework, 
which  would  force  the  change  in parameters  to occur  concurrently,  the 
AR(1)  coefficient  framework  produces  estimates  that  are  often  hard  to 
interpret.  The  following  exercises  could  shed  more  light  on  the  empiri 
cal  results:  (a) estimate  a  model  in  which  only  the policy  rule  coefficient Comment  157 
change,  but  not  the  coefficients  of  the  preference  and  technology  pa 
rameters;  (b) allow  for  correlation  between  the  innovations  to  the policy 
rule  coefficients  and  the  private  sector  coefficients  that  determine  the 
degree  of nominal  rigidity. 
5  What  Can  We  Learn  from  Subsamples? 
Based  on  the  policy  rule  estimates  reported  by  FVRR,  I  estimate  a 
constant-coefficient  DSGE  model  to  three  subsamples,  ranging  from 
1955:1  to  1969:1V  (low  target  inflation),  1970:1  to  1979:111  (high  target  infla 
tion),  and  1987:111  to 2004:1  (low  target  inflation,  strong  response  to  infla 
tion movements).  In addition  to  the  observations  on  consumption,  hours 
worked,  and  wages  (previously  described),  I am  using  data  on  real  per 
capita  output  (GDP  converted  by  JGDP  and  LN16N),  real  investment  per 
capita  (I +  CD  converted  by  JGDP  and  LN16N),  inflation  defined  as  the 
log  difference  of  the GDP  deflator,  and  the  effective  Federal  Funds  Rate 
(FFED). 
My  analysis  can  be  interpreted  as  follows:  suppose  there  are  three 
econometricians,  equipped  with  the  same  prior  distribution,  and  each 
econometrician  studies  one  of  the  subsamples.  Will  these  econometri 
cians  obtain  markedly  different  posterior  distributions?  I am  using  the 
DSGE  model  studied  in Del  Negro,  Schorfheide,  Smets,  and Wouters 
(2007),  henceforth  DSSW.  The  DSGE  model  is based  on work  by  Chris 
tiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Evans  (2005)  and  Smets  and Wouters  (2003)  and 
contains  numerous  nominal  and  real  frictions.  The  specification  of  the 
model  is very  similar  to  that  of  FVRR.  The main  difference  is that neither 
the policy  rule  coefficients  nor  the parameters  that  determine  the degree 
of nominal  rigidity  drift  over  time. Moreover,  I solve  the model  using  a 
log-linear  instead  of  a high-order  approximation  to  the  equilibrium  con 
ditions.  Details  about  the model  specification,  the  choice  of  prior  distri 
bution,  and  the  implementation  of  the Bayesian  analysis  can  be  found  in 
DSSW  and  An  and  Schorfheide  (2007). 
Prior  and  posterior  means  and  90  percent  credible  intervals  for  the 
DSGE  model  parameters  are  reported  in  table  2C2.1.  In  line with  the  es 
timates  reported  by  FVF1R,  the  target  inflation  rate was  high  in  the  1970s 
(around  6 percent  annualized)  and  lower  in  the  1960s  and  during  the 
Greenspan  period.  The  estimated  reaction  to  inflation  movements  was 
weaker  in  the  1970s  than  it  was  in  the  other  two  subsamples.2  Most  In 
terestingly,  the  estimated  fraction  of  firms  that  are  unable  to  reoptimize Table 
2C2.1 
Subsample  Parameter  Estimates 
Posterior 
Prior  1955:1  to  1969.TV  1970:1  to  1979:111  1987:111  to  2004:1 
Mean  90%Intv  Mean 
90%Intv 
Mean  90%Intv  Mean  90%Intv 
Policy  Rule  Coefficients 
Reaction  to  inflation^  1.55  [0.98,2.10]  1.99 
[1.43,2.55] 
1.58  [1.07,2.08]  2.56  [2.01,3.10]  Reaction  to  output  i|/2  0.20  [0.05,0.35]  0.07 
[0.03,0.11] 
0.12  [0.03,0.21]  0.08  [0.03,0.13] 
Smoothing  pR  0.50  [0.16,0.82]  0.87 
[0.83,0.92] 
0.71  [0.58,0.86]  0.84  [0.79,0.88] 
Target  inflation  tt?2>  1.00  [-0.65,2.65]  0.96 
[0.44,1.50] 
1.52  [0.72,2.28]  0.83  [0.55,1.09] 
Nominal  Rigidities 
Calvo  prices  ?p  0.60  [0.29,0.93]  0.78 
[0.73,0.83] 
0.57  [0.37,0.74]  0.79  [0.73,0.85]  Calvo  wages  t,w  0.60  [0.30,0.95]  0.64 
[0.54,0.75] 
0.66  [0.51,0.81]  0.49  [0.34,0.63] 
Preferences 
Parameters 
Habit  formation  h  0.70  [0.62,0.78]  0.71 
[0.63,0.78] 
0.78  [0.72,0.84]  0.71  [0.65,0.78] 
Discount  f  actor  1/(3-1  =  r<?>  0.50  [0.11,0.86] 
0.28 
[0.07,0.48]  0.20  [0.06,0.34]  0.29  [0.11,0.45] 
Frisch  elasticity  v,  1.99  [0.82,3.16]  1.02  [0.44,1.55]  1.23  [0.55,1.90]  1.39  [0.65,2.13] 
Technology  Parameters 
Capital  share  a  0.33  [0.17,0.49]  0.23 
[0.21,0.25] 
0.29  [0.26,0.32]  0.28  [0.27,0.30] 
Capital  adjustment  costs  s'  4.01  [1.70,6.36]  2.74  [1.19,4.26]  1.90  [0.60,3.09]  2.05  [1.03,2.98] 
Utilization  costs  a"  0.20  [0.04,0.34]  0.27 
[0.11,0.43] 
0.27  [0.09,0.43]  0.29  [0.12,0.45] 
Technology  growth  7  0.50  [0.12,0.86]  0.21 
[0.06,0.35] 
0.15  [0.03,0.26]  0.35  [0.21,0.48] Other  Parameters 
Government  spending  g*  0.15  [0.07,0.23]  0.31 
[0.29,0.32] 
0.26  [0.25,0.28]  0.20  [0.18,0.21] 
Shocks 
Technology  growth  p2  0.20  [0.04,0.35]  0.24  [0.11,0.36]  0.15  [0.04,0.25]  0.16  [0.06,0.26]  Technology  growth  ct2  0.50  [0.21,0.79]  1.00  [0.86,1.16]  1.15  [0.93,1.36]  0.69  [0.59,0.79] 
Preference  shock  P+  0.80  [0.72,0.88]  0.77 
[0.69,0.85] 
0.81  [0.72,0.89]  0.87  [0.81,0.94] 
Preference  shock  o-+  1.25  [0.54,1.97]  2.80  [1.58,4.03]  3.12  [1.82,4.41]  3.12  [1.84,4.36] 
Price  mark-up  pX/  0.60  [0.29,0.93]  0.12 
[0.03,0.21] 
0.37  [0.09,0.65]  0.15  [0.03,0.26]  Price  mark-up  aX/  1.25  [0.55,2.02]  0.32  [0.27,0.36]  0.43  [0.34,0.52]  0.30  [0.26,0.35] 
Inv-specific  technology  p^  0.80  [0.72,0.88]  0.83  [0.77,0.90]  0.75  [0.66,0.84]  0.81  [0.74,0.88] 
Inv-specific  technology^  1.25  [0.54,1.96]  1.00  [0.78,1.21]  1.43  [1.00,1.83]  0.59  [0.47,0.71]  Intertemp.  preferences  pb  0.60  [0.27,0.92] 
0.90 
[0.82,0.97]  0.52  [0.28,0.77]  0.76  [0.61,0.92]  Intertemp.  preferences  vb  0.25  [0.11,0.40]  0.61  [0.36,0.86]  0.33  [0.25,0.42]  0.31  [0.23,0.39] 
Government  spending  p^  0.80  [0.72,0.88]  0.86  [0.81,0.92]  0.87  [0.82,0.93]  0.95  [0.94,0.97]  Government  spending^  0.38  [0.16,0.59]  0.36  [0.30,0.41]  0.61  [0.47,0.73]  0.35  [0.29,0.40] 
Monetary  policy  aR  0.25  [0.11,0.40]  0.14 
[0.12,0.16] 
0.31  [0.25,0.37]  0.16  [0.13,0.18] 
Notes:  The  following  parameters  are  fixed  in  the  estimation:  capital  depreciation  8  =  0.25;  price  and  wage  indexation  lp  =  lw  =  0;  fixed  costs  2F;  steady 
state  price  markup  Xf  =  0.15  and  wage  markup  \w  =  0.3. 
The 
parameter  names  match  the  model  specification  in  DSSW. 160  Schorfheide 
their  prices  is  lower  in  the  1970s  than  in  the  other  two  episodes.  This  re 
sult  is consistent  with  the  FVRR  findings,  which  appears  to be  fairly  sig 
nificant  in  the  sense  that  the  90  percent  credible  intervals  for 
lp 
essen 
tially  do  not  overlap.  The  estimate  of  the  degree  of wage  stickiness,  on 
the  other  hand,  appears  to be  lower  during  the  low-inflation  Greenspan 
period  than  prior  to  1980.  In general,  the  interpretation  of  the  subsample 
estimates  is difficult  because  the posterior  means  of many  of  the prefer 
ence  and  technology  parameters  as well  as  the  shock  autocorrelations 
and  standard  deviations  shift  at  the  same  time.  The  same  can  be  said  for 
the  estimates  reported  by  FVRR:  as Calvo  parameters  as well  as  the  in 
dexation  parameters  for prices  and  wages  drift  over  time,  it  is very  dif 
ficult  to assess  the  effect  on  the  overall  degree  of nominal  rigidity  in  the 
economy. 
To  obtain  a  summary  statistic  for  the degree  of  rigidity,  I compute  im 
pulse  responses  to a monetary  policy  shock  that  lowers  the nominal  in 
terest  rate  by  25 basis  points,  based  on  the  three  posterior  distributions 
reported  in  table  2C2.1.  Along  the  impulse  response,  I compute  for  the 
first  eight  periods  the  ratio  of  quarter-to-quarter  inflation  and  output, 
which  can?loosely  speaking?be  interpreted  as  the  slope  of  the 
Phillips  curve  and  a measure  of  nominal  rigidity.  The  larger  this  slope, 
the  smaller  the nominal  rigidity  and  the  extent  to  which  a  monetary  pol 
icy  shock  has  an  effect  on  real  output.  Figure  2C2.4  depicts  pointwise  90 
percent  credible  intervals  for  the  output/inflation  trade-off  for  the 
Greenspan  period  as well  as  the  1960s.  The  intervals  essentially  overlap. 
Figure  2C2.5  compares  the  response  function  from  the Greenspan  pe 
riod  to  the  responses  in  the  1970s.  Again,  the  intervals  for  the  "Phillips 
curve  slope"  overlap.  While  an  econometrician  who  studies  the  1970s 
and  an  econometrician  who  studies  the Greenspan  period  would  esti 
mate  different  target  inflation  rates  and  Calvo  adjustment  probabilities, 
the  two  investigators  would  essentially  come  to  the  same  conclusion 
about  the magnitude  of  the  output-inflation  tradeoff  and  the  effect  of 
monetary  policy  shocks. 
6  Conclusion 
There  is  much  to be  learned  from  the  FVRR  paper.  It  is an  impressive 
piece  of work  that  breaks  new  ground  in  the  estimation  of DSGE  mod 
els with  time-varying  parameters.  The  econometric  and  computational 
techniques  have  a  wide  range  of  applications  and will  be  very  useful  for Comment  161 
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Figure  2C2.4 
Impulse  Responses  to  a  Monetary  Policy  Shock:  Sub-samples  I and  III 
Notes:  The  figure  depicts  pointwise  90%  credible  intervals  for  responses  to  a  monetary  pol 
icy  shock  that  lowers  the  annualized  nominal  interest  rate  by  25  basis  points.  Inflation  re 
sponse  is  annualized.  The  lower  right  panel  depicts  the  ratio  of  quarter-to-quarter  infla 
tion  and  percentage  deviations  of  output  from  steady  state  for  the  first  8 periods  after  the 
shock. 
future  research.  The  complexity  of  the  empirical  model  raises  identifi 
cation  problems  and  provides  a  challenge  for  the  interpretation  of  the 
estimation  results.  The  apparent  co-movement  of  policy  and  taste-and 
technology  parameters  is  intriguing,  and  I  view  this  paper  as  an  impor 
tant  step  toward  a better  understanding  of how  structural  structural  pa 
rameters  really  are. However,  more  research  is needed  to  shed  light  on 
the  causes  and  consequences  of  the parameter  drift. 
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Figure  2C2.5 
Impulse  Responses  to  a  Monetary  Policy  Shock:  Sub-samples  II and  III 
Notes:  See  figure  2C2.4. 
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Endnotes 
1.  If  there  is  a  steady-state  price  dispersion,  then  ?t and  x,  do  appear  in  the  log-linear  ap 
proximation. 
2.  Unlike  Lubik  and  Schorfheide  (2004),  I restrict  \\t1 to  the  region  of  the  parameter  space 
that  implies  determinacy. 
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